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Factoids in ancient history: the case of fifth-century Cyprus

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Abstract: Factoids—a word coined by Norman Mailer in his introduction to *Marilyn*—are mere speculations or guesses which have been repeated so often that they are eventually taken for hard facts. There is something decidedly unbiological about such factoids: the tendency to get stronger the longer they live is one of their most insidious qualities. Factoids occur in all branches of scholarship and many are of course still well disguised—their complete discovery would create havoc in the subjects concerned. Archaeology, converted from treasure hunting into an historical discipline, is for obvious reasons prone to create a number of factoids. The process by which mere hypotheses attain the apparent rank of established fact, without ever having been proved, presents a linguistic and a psychological aspect. Linguistically, words or particles indicating the hypothetical character of a statement are dropped one by one in a process of constant repetition. The subjunctive is exchanged for the indicative, and in the end the factoid is formulated as a straightforward factual sentence. Psychologically, the repetition of unproved hypotheses is facilitated by an attitude which is as indispensable in research as it is ambivalent: a certain amount of implicit trust in the results of other scholars' research.

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FACTOIDS IN ANCIENT HISTORY: THE CASE OF FIFTH-CENTURY CYPRUS

FACTOIDS—a word coined by Norman Mailer in his introduction to *Marilyn*—are mere speculations or guesses which have been repeated so often that they are eventually taken for hard facts. There is something decidedly unbiological about such factoids: the tendency to get stronger the longer they live is one of their most insidious qualities. Factoids occur in all branches of scholarship and many are of course still well disguised—their complete discovery would create havoc in the subjects concerned. Archaeology, converted from treasure hunting into an historical discipline, is for obvious reasons prone to create a number of factoids.¹

The process by which mere hypotheses attain the apparent rank of established fact, without ever having been proved, presents a linguistic and a psychological aspect. Linguistically, words or particles indicating the hypothetical character of a statement are dropped one by one in a process of constant repetition. The subjunctive is exchanged for the indicative, and in the end the factoid is formulated as a straightforward factual sentence. Psychologically, the repetition of unproved hypotheses is facilitated by an attitude which is as indispensable in research as it is ambivalent: a certain amount of implicit trust in the results of other scholars' research. No scholar is able to check all statements in a book or long article against the original sources: this would be tantamount to doing all the work again. Leading authorities in a certain field of research are usually accorded a special measure of such trust. Thus the quality of their statements is—subconsciously—improved, the process of creating a factoid accelerated. Trust in other scholars' reliability, trust in authorities: none of us can work without them, and yet this attitude sometimes blunts the critical appraisal of results of research. None of us is free from such proclivities at times. The following case study in factoids is meant to make us all more critically aware.

The process of creating factoids can be described in a general way, but it can also be studied in detail in particular cases. One such case is the history of the kingdoms of Cyprus in the fifth and early fourth centuries BC. 'We know very little of the history of Cyprus during that period, but the Cypro-Greek cities were reduced to a state of political nullity, and Persia was determined to eradicate the last survival of philhellene mentality . . . The alliance of Persians and Phoenicians against the Cypro-Greek cities . . . was intensified and developed into a systematic action intended to turn Cyprus into a Persian country administered by Phoenicians.'² The leading idea is obvious: a basic conflict between the Greek kingdoms in the island and their Achaemenid overlord, originating from 'national' ambitions and cultural antagonism. The Phoenician dynasties combine with the Persians, and this leads to a political and cultural dominance of the Phoenician element in Cyprus and to a repression of the Greeks and their civilization. The idea of such a 'national conflict' between Phoenicians and Greeks in Cyprus had found favour already with scholars such as Busolt and Oberhummer; it was adopted in Gjerstad's treatment of Cyprus in the Classical period.³ Research articles as well as general histories of Cyprus published since draw extensively on this interpretation of the island's history.⁴

Abbreviations: Masson, ICS=O. Masson, *Les inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques*² (Paris 1983); RDAC= *Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus*; SCE= *The Swedish Cyprus Expedition*, 4 vols (Stockholm 1935–1972).

¹ One reason has been pointed out by A. M. Snodgrass in M. H. Crawford, ed., *Sources for ancient history* (Cambridge 1983) 142–3, 145–6: the desire of Classical archaeologists to make their results conform to an old-fashioned 'event-orientated' kind of history.

² E. Gjerstad, SCE iv.2 (1948) 484–5.

³ G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* iii (1897) 344; E. Oberhummer, RE xii.1 (1924) 93, 102; Gjerstad, SCE iv.2 479–507. Gjerstad's views were developed in a series of earlier publications: *Corolla Archaeologica*, Acta Inst. Rom. Regni Sueciae ii (1932) 155–71; *AJA* xxxvii (1933) 589–98, 658–9; SCE iii (1937) 286–90; *Opuscula Archaeologica* iv (1946) 21–4. 'The Phoenician Colonization and Expansion in Cyprus', RDAC 1979, especially 240, 247–8, 250–3, brings his arguments together.

⁴ Gjerstad's interpretation has been largely accepted by, *inter alios*, F. G. Maier, *Cyprus from the earliest time to*

We know indeed very little of the fifth-century history of Cyprus, as our evidence for the one hundred and fifty years between the Ionian Revolt and the battle of Issos is extremely defective and often confusing. For most of the kingdoms—if we except the reign of Euagoras I of Salamis—information is restricted to a number of coins with the names of rulers and to a more or less extensive series of archaeological finds. How then could such an interpretation arise, and on what evidence is it based?

The widely accepted view of Cypriot history as part of a conflict between Greece and the Orient rests on the subconscious notion of ethnocultural difference and enmity. It is liable to impose the modern concept of nationality upon the past. There is one ancient author, Isocrates, whose writings are thought to endorse the conception of an ideological anti-Greek policy of the Achaemenids in Cyprus and of a deep antagonism between Greeks and Phoenicians in the island. Yet Isocrates, albeit more or less a contemporary, can hardly be considered a reliable historical witness. He was neither very familiar with the particular conditions of Cyprus nor a tolerably unbiased recorder of events. In general he tends to harp vehemently on the attempts of Persia to use discord between the Greeks to her own advantage. In particular his Cypriot pamphlets (*Euagoras*, *ad Nicoclem* and *Nicocles*) are openly eulogistic and strongly influenced by his political philosophy. Both tendencies distort not only his portraits of the Salaminian kings but also his appreciation of the overall situation in Cyprus.

Isocrates has often, and with good reason, been criticized for his 'rhetorical exaggerations'.⁵ Such critical remarks have, however, not always led to a critical perusal of Isocrates' Cypriot orations. None of these actually contains a reference to a Greek–Phoenician antagonism in the island.⁶ Not even from the text of the *Euagoras* does it follow that an encouragement of the Phoenicians in Cyprus was general Persian policy. Only the Phoenician from Tyre who usurped the throne of Salamis in the middle of the fifth century is described as being vehemently anti-Greek in his attitude and working in close co-operation with Persia. Isocrates paints a gloomy picture of Salamis, turned into a *polis ekbarbarōmenē* by the Phoenician's rule (ix 19–20, 47, 49)—a picture which has long been disproved by archaeology. Yet even if the Phoenician usurper at Salamis had acted as suggested by Isocrates (as a convenient counterfoil to Euagoras' philhellenism), this single instance of a Phoenician ruler at once persophile and anti-Greek would hardly furnish sufficient proof for a general alliance of Persians and Phoenicians against the Cypro-Greek cities.

Isocrates' basic assumptions about Greeks and non-Greeks may still appeal to the classicist's mind. The Salaminian usurper's episode could, however, only be expanded into a general interpretation of Cypriot history in the Classical period because such a distorted view of events seemed to be supported by a number of other relevant facts: (i) the siege of Idalion by Persians and Kitians (c. 478?); (ii) the conquest of Idalion by Kition (c. 470?); (iii) the installation of 'medophile' dynasties in several cities; (iv) the construction of the palace of Vouni by a 'medophile' ruler of Marion to control the 'hellenophile' city of Soloi (c. 498?), and its reconstruction by a new 'hellenophile' dynasty of Marion (c. 450?);⁷ (v) the waning of Greek art and culture in Cyprus during the middle and later fifth century.

the present day (London 1968) 41–4; H. D. Purcell, *Cyprus* (London 1969) 88–90; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (London 1972) 481–3; V. Karageorghis, *Cyprus, from the Stone Age to the Romans* (London 1982) 156–8, 161–6; V. Tatton-Brown, in *Footprints in Cyprus* (London 1982) 92–4, 96–7. G. F. Hill, *A history of Cyprus i* (London 1949) 111–53 also uses the Greek–Phoenician aspect, but in a more reserved way.

⁵ E.g. by Hill (n. 4) 129; Gjerstad, *SCE* iv.2 484; J. Pouilloux, *RDAC* 1975, 116–17.

⁶ As pointed out already by J. Seibert, 'Zur Bevölkerungsstruktur Cyperns', *Ancient Society* vii (1976) 5–7. *Ad Nicoclem* does not mention Phoenicians at all; *Nicocles* contains one neutral reference to Phoenician rule at Salamis (28) and the remark that Carthage and

Sparta are the best-governed states in the world (24)—certainly not an anti-Phoenician statement.

⁷ Another minor factoid of the same type may be mentioned here: the 'Persian commander's residence' at Palaipaphos, referred to by Meiggs (n. 4) 481; Karageorghis (n. 4) 156; Tatton-Brown (n. 4) 96. The plan of this building shows evident parallels with Achaemenid architecture, but it cannot be dated closer than Cypro-Achaic II, 600–475 BC. (J. Schäfer, *Opusc. Arch.* iii [1960] 155–75); it could thus just as well have been the residence of a Paphian king who used the palaces of his overlord as a model for his own. Characteristically the question mark of Schäfer's title 'Ein Perserbau in Alt-Paphos?' was dropped in the later references.

In terms of method it seems debatable whether these few pieces of evidence, spaced over a long span of time, can warrant the broad generalizations based on them. But even he who accepts such a proposition is faced with the problem that most of these apparent proofs do not stand up to close scrutiny. In discussing the evidence a basic rule of method has to be borne in mind. If a literary source or an archaeological find context admit of several reasonable explanations with the same degree of plausibility, they cannot be considered as sufficient proof for *one* of these possible inferences—unless this particular interpretation is supported, in contrast to others, by independently established evidence.

(i) The siege and conquest of Idalion can be verified as historical facts from the testimony of coins and inscriptions, although the interpretation of these facts remains open to discussion. The Idalian bronze tablet records in line 1 a siege of Idalion by ‘Medes and Kitians’.⁸ The date of the tablet is disputed, between *c.* 478 and *c.* 445 BC if not later.⁹ Context and causes of such a combined attack of Persians and Kitians are not known. Yet whatever the date and the circumstances, it is a reliably recorded instance of Perso-Phoenician cooperation against a city ruled by a Greek dynasty in the fifth century BC.

This siege of Idalion seems not to have been followed immediately by the final conquest of the city. The wording of the tablet suggests that the siege had not succeeded and that the Idalion king Stasikypros still ruled when the inscription was set up. There is no proof that after the siege Stasikypros reconstructed the city wall revealed by recent excavation;¹⁰ nor that the destruction of the western acropolis of Idalion was connected with the final incorporation of Idalion into the kingdom of Kition—we simply do not know whether this event was coupled with a new attack on the city of Idalion.¹¹

(ii) The fact of conquest, however, is undisputed. It took place in the reign of King Ozbaal: he styles himself ‘king of Kition and Idalion’, while his father and predecessor Baalmelek I is still called only ‘king of Kition’. The exact date of Ozbaal’s reign depends on the still debated chronology of the kings of Kition, which largely hinges upon the date of the Idalion tablet.¹² But again, whatever the precise date, this event represents a reliably recorded instance of a Phoenician kingdom annexing a Greek city in Cyprus during the fifth century BC.¹³

(iii) The remaining evidence, however, on critical examination leaves something to be desired. The problem of ‘medophile’ dynasties, supposed to have been installed by the Persians, involves another point of method. Do Phoenician names prove generally that the bearer of such a name is non-Greek? And even if we could quietly assume that rulers with a Phoenician name were always Phoenicians, does it follow without further proof that they were as such

⁸ Masson, *ICS* no. 217; *CAH* iii 3, 72.

⁹ Gjerstad, *SCE* iv. 2 479 f. and Masson *ICS* 238 favour 478–470; Hill (n. 4) 153–5 and K. Spyridakis, *Euagoras I von Salamis* (Berlin 1935) 42 opt for *c.* 450–445. The argument, archaeology *vs.* numismatics, is inconclusive: the destruction of the western acropolis of Idalion (if it can be dated as closely as 470, see below n. 11) does not necessarily prove the end of Idalian independence. New coin hoards seem to strengthen the case for the later date: *cf.* for argument and references Meiggs (n. 4) 484–5.

¹⁰ *BCH* xcvi (1974) 882, cii (1978) 925, ciii (1979) 708–10; dated by the excavators to the ‘beginning of the Classical epoch’. That the signs BA.SA on Idalian coins of the late sixth / early fifth century represent ‘an abbreviation of king Stasikypros’ and that the siege took place during the Ionian Revolt is assumed by Gjerstad, *RDAC* 1979, 240 n. 1. The note is, incidentally, an example of his way of reasoning: ‘Ba.Sa could be an abbreviation’ changes seven lines further to ‘as it is

likely’, and ‘consequently . . . the reign of his successor . . . cannot be dated earlier than *c.* 495 B.C.’.

¹¹ The destruction of the western acropolis is dated *c.* 470 in *SCE* ii 265; but this does not seem to accord with the post-Achaic coins found there in the latest layer (the coins are explained as ‘having slipped down’ from the surface layer, *ibid.* 617). Nor does the destruction of the temple of Athena on the acropolis necessarily imply that ‘Idalion ceased to be an independent state’ (*SCE* iv.2 479 n. 5).

¹² Ozbaal is usually dated after 450 BC. For the Idalian coins see *BMC Coins Cyprus* xlix–liii; Masson, *ICS* 250–2.

¹³ The incorporation of the Greek kingdom of Tamassos into the kingdom of Kition in the middle of the fourth century is a different case: the bankrupt king of Tamassos sold his kingdom to Pumiathon of Kition (Duris, *FGH* 76 F 4 and H. Donner–W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*² [Berlin 1966–9] no. 32).

'medophile'? This seems a rather far-flung *petitio principii* which is nonetheless often accepted without question.¹⁴

The case of Lapethos on the north coast of the island seems especially complicated. One tradition, represented by Strabo (xiv 682 C), regards it as a Greek foundation. Ps.-Scylax, on the other hand, records *Λάπηθος Φοινίκων* (103). The archaeological evidence recovered so far is interpreted as indicating a predominantly Greek population at Lapethos. Inscriptions, however, also demonstrate a certain Phoenician presence.¹⁵ To this the list of kings of Lapethos apparently conforms. The sequence of rulers in the fifth and fourth centuries, as compiled from coins, inscriptions and Diodorus, is tolerably well established: Demonikos I, Sidqimilk, Andr . . . , Demonikos II, . . . ippos?, Berekshemesh; he was perhaps followed by the king Praxippos whom Ptolemy deposed in 312 BC (Diod. xix 79. 4).¹⁶ Thus both Greek and Phoenician names occur in the list, but all kings (except for Praxippos) uniformly use Phoenician signs for their coin legends.

It has been suggested that Demonikos I lost his throne in 499/8, in consequence of the Ionian Revolt, to Sidqimilk. But all dates given for the reigns of the kings of Lapethos derive from a stylistic assessment of the coins, which is necessarily somewhat vague and in any case not precise enough for a historical chronology.¹⁷ All historical inferences seemingly supporting the stylistic coin chronology, on the other hand, rest on the assumption which still has to be proved—that kings with Greek names were 'hellenophile', rulers with Phoenician names 'persophile'. In other words, what was meant to be proved by the date of the coins is used as evidence for these very dates. With due caution it can only be said that Lapethos presents a list of kings in which Greek and Phoenician names occur side by side. We do not, however, know of any actions or political leanings of these kings; nor is there any evidence of Persian interference at Lapethos. In itself the list of kings is hardly compatible with the idea of Phoenician dominance and repression of Greeks.¹⁸

At Marion the list of recorded kings opens with Doxandros. His son bears the Phoenician name of Sasma; some of his coins show the Phoenician letters *ML* beside his name written in syllabic signs.¹⁹ The later kings Stasioikos and Timocharis again have perfectly good Greek names and use the syllabic script for their coin legends. The last king of Marion was Stasioikos II (c. 330–312 BC), whose coins show digraphic legends.²⁰

This (most likely incomplete) list is usually given a very specific historical interpretation.²¹ Doxandros and Sasma were 'medophile' kings set up by Persia after 499/8 BC. Stasioikos I and Timocharis represent the 'hellenophile' rulers installed in 451/50 BC by Kimon during his expedition to Cyprus. Yet again the close stylistic dating of the coins of Sasma to 470–60 BC is hardly tenable and only *seems* to be confirmed by connections with recorded historical events.

Doxandros' and Sasma's rule is connected with the aftermath of the Ionian Revolt on the assumption that Doxandros really was a Phoenician bearing a Greek name and that both kings were persophile because they were Phoenicians. Kimon's attack on Marion does not prove, however, that its ruler at that time (if it was Sasma) was Phoenician and persophile. Cyprus

¹⁴ But see the critical remarks of Seibert (n. 6) 25–6.

¹⁵ The inscriptions come, strictly speaking, from the nearby site of Larnaka-tis-Lapithou and are fairly late. One text dates from the later fourth century: A. Honeyman, *Muséon* li (1938) 285–98; early Hellenistic texts attest an important Phoenician family at Lapethos: Donner–Rölling (n. 13) nos 42, 43; see Seibert (n. 6) 21–3, H. Volkmann, *Historia* v (1956) 448–55.

¹⁶ For these coins of Lapethos see W. Schwabacher, *Nordisk Numismatisk Arsskrift* (1947) 79–84; E. S. G. Robinson, *NC*⁶ viii (1948) 45–7, 60–5; O. Masson–M. Sznycer, *Recherches sur les Phéniciens en Chypre* (Genève/Paris 1972) 97–100.

¹⁷ See the arguments of Robinson (n. 16) 61–4. If, as he assumes, the coins of Demonikos closely resemble

Athenian tetradrachms of about 500 BC, it seems hardly convincing to date his deposition to 499.

¹⁸ See Seibert (n. 6) 19–21 for a possible interpretation of Lapethos as city with 'griechisch-phönikischer Mischbevölkerung'.

¹⁹ Gjerstad, *Opusc. Arch.* iv (1946) 21–3, dating Doxandros after 499, Sasma c. 470/60–450 (the stylistic comparison with a number of relics, *ibid.* 22 n. 9, seems hardly sufficient to establish the precise date 470/60 for the Sasma coins). See further Masson, *ICS* 181–2; Masson–Sznycer (n. 16) 79–81.

²⁰ Hill, *BMC Coins Cyprus* lvii–lix; Gjerstad, *Opusc. Arch.* iv (1946) 23–4; W. Schwabacher, *ibid.* 29–35; Masson, *ICS* 183–5.

²¹ Following Gjerstad, *Opusc. Arch.* iv (1946) 22–3.

naturally formed a key point in Kimon's strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Marion was important as the harbour easiest of access from Asia Minor—whether its ruler was pro-Greek or anti-Greek. On the other hand, a Cypriot king at that time had good reasons, even without 'medophile' leanings, to object to capture by Athens, for Athens was known to force democracy upon her allies. In short, the current interpretation of the Marion king list is tenable only when we accept as an already established fact the Persian policy which is presumed to be proved by such dynastic changes—an obvious piece of circular reasoning. After all, the onomastic problem of Doxandros–Sasmas admits of several plausible interpretations.²² It thus cannot be regarded as reliable independent evidence for a pro-Persian attitude on the part of these kings.

In the case of Stasioikos I and Timocharis stylistically dated coins are again connected with Kimon's expedition, one of the few reliably recorded events of the fifth-century history of Cyprus. The hypothesis here rests on the assumption that Kimon actually took Marion in 451/50 and thus was able to engineer a dynastic change in the city. Yet a conquest of Marion is not proved by the text of Diodorus (xii 3.3), although this is often assumed. *Κίτιον μὲν καὶ Μάριον ἐξεπολιόρκησε* is indeed his phrasing. But Diodorus is demonstrably wrong about Kition: Thucydides (i 112.4) and Plutarch (*Cim.* 19) clearly show that Kition was not taken. This may or may not mean that Diodorus is wrong also about Marion: the sentence remains ambiguous and cannot be used as positive evidence for a conquest of Marion. Furthermore, and apart from the problem of Kimon's interference, it would seem difficult to explain how two hellenophile rulers were allowed to wield considerable power during the time of alleged Phoenician ascendancy after the failure of Kimon's operations.

The interpretation of the lists of kings from Lapethos and Marion as evidence for Greek–Phoenician–Persian conflicts thus turns out to be purely speculative, truly a factoid. The only instance of a change from a Greek to a Phoenician ruler who worked in close concord with Persian policy is represented by the Tyrian usurper at Salamis already referred to. He was, however, not installed by Persia but was obviously a ruthless adventurer seeking personal power. The Phoenician Abdemon who replaced him or one of his descendants (Isoc. ix 26; Diod. xiv 98) seems to have been no special Persian favourite, as the Achae-menids did not react at all when the Greek Euagoras in 411 BC ousted this Phoenician king.

(iv) The 'political history' of the palace of Vouni is usually represented as follows: Doxandros, the 'medophile' king installed by Persia at Marion after 499/8 BC, built the first palace of Vouni—characteristically in Eteo-Cypriot, Oriental style. The purpose of Vouni was to keep in check the neighbouring Greek city of Soloi which had ceased to be an independent kingdom after its siege and conquest by Persian troops in 498. After his capture of Marion in 451/50, Kimon replaced Doxandros' equally persophile son Sasmas by the Greek and 'philhellene' king Stasioikos I. He rebuilt the palace in an hellenized style. At the beginning of the fourth century Soloi regained its independence and in revenge destroyed the palace in c. 380 BC.²³

The problem is that practically none of the elements of this plausible-sounding story is based on unambiguous evidence. We have already seen that there is no proof for Doxandros' and Sasmas' 'medophile' attitude nor for the assumption that Kimon installed at Marion a 'new anti-Persian king of the Greek national party in Cyprus'. There is, furthermore, no cogent reason why the palace of Vouni should have been built 'approximately contemporary with the capture of Soli in 498 BC'. The excavators date the first building period to c. 500–c. 450/40 BC:²⁴ thus in their own frame of reference even Stasioikos I could have built the first palace.

In the same way there is no positive proof for Soloi's loss of independence after 498. Admittedly, no fifth-century coins of Soloi have been found so far.²⁵ But even if one would

²² See Seibert (n. 6) 24–5.

²³ Based on Gjerstad, cf. above n. 3; doubts were formulated briefly by Seibert (n. 6) 10 n. 30, 26 n. 87.

²⁴ SCE iii 286–7.

²⁵ See H. Gesche, 'Literaturüberblicke der griechischen Numismatik. Cypern', *Jb. Num. u. Geldgesch.* xx (1970) 167, 176–7, 204.

accept such an *argumentum ex silentio*, it furnishes no evidence for the real point of the story: that a king of Marion built Vouni as a stronghold against Soloi. This assumption is again based on a fairly ambiguous argument. The Vouni hoard indeed contains 60% coins of Marion.²⁶ But to infer that the ruler of the palace therefore was a king of Marion seems a slightly dangerous use of hoard statistics—especially if one considers what deductions could be drawn from other hoards by such a line of reasoning. The inhabitant of the palace who dumped this hoard under a staircase could well have amassed Marion coins for reasons in no way connected with the person of the then ruler of the palace.

Nor is the archaeological interpretation of the plan of the palace unambiguous. The first palace may be described as a Cypriot adaption of the ‘*liwan*’ type of building and as such is indeed of oriental antecedents. To adapt such models seems reasonably natural for a Persian vassal king and does not in itself imply political leanings.²⁷ It needs, on the other hand, considerable imagination to discover in the mid-fifth-century blocking of the south end of the central ‘state room’ of the palace and in a few other minor changes of plan the creation of a ‘megaron-shaped main room’ and thus the appliance of ‘Greek architectural principles’.²⁸ Apart from the fact that the notion of the ‘*megaron*’ tends to be overtaxed by archaeologists, it would seem more than rash to deduce details of political history from the ground plan of royal residences.

There is, furthermore, not the slightest hint in our sources to suggest an attack of Soloi on the palace. Even if a non-political catastrophe could be definitely excluded (as the excavators seem to believe), the date given for the destruction of Vouni—‘at the beginning of the 4th century, about 380 BC’—would equally well fit the operations of Euagoras against Soloi and Marion in or shortly after 391 (Diod. xiv 98.2–3). Once more the archaeological context admits of at least two equally plausible explanations.

(v) Finally, the results of recent archaeological research do not support the hypothesis that the civilisation of Cyprus in the time between the Ionian Revolt and the reign of Euagoras was marked by an ‘anti-Greek movement favoured by the Persians’, while ‘the island was culturally almost isolated from Greece’.²⁹ Objects of Greek, and especially of Attic, art were imported without interruption throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. On some sites a certain decrease in the amount of imported Attic pottery during the first half of the fifth century has been recorded. It has been explained by the political and military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean between 490 and 450 BC which must have affected trading exchanges to some degree.³⁰ It has to be noted, however, that at Marion the tomb groups classified as Cypro-Classical I A (c. 475–440 BC) still contain 13.5% of Attic vessels, and that recent finds from the acropolis of Amathous include a not inconsiderable proportion of late sixth- and early fifth-century Attic pottery.³¹ Yet even if Attic pottery and its import into Cyprus could be dated so precisely that the quantity of imports in the first and in the second half of the century could be reliably compared, a possible decrease of pottery imports in the earlier part of the century should not be overstressed. To some degree it is balanced by the import of Greek sculpture such as the ‘Chatsworth Apollo’ (c. 470–60), the marble kouros head from Lapethos (c.

²⁶ Schwabacher (n. 20) 43.

²⁷ See above n. 7.

²⁸ Gjerstad, *AJA* xxxvii (1933) 598, *SCE* iii 288; but see already the objections of V. Müller, *AJA* xxxvii (1933) 599, Seibert (n. 6) 10 n. 30. There is no cogent reason why entrance to the second palace should have been possible only from the northern corner of the building. As there was ‘a wide doorway’ (*SCE* iii 122) between walls 58 and 57, the palace could be entered then, as in the first period, also from the southwest front. How we can know that the blocked central room ‘was meant to be a megaron’ is not explained. To call all rectangular rooms divided into an anteroom and a main

room ‘megaroid’ (J. Schäfer, *AA* 1983, 552) confuses the issue even more.

²⁹ Spyridakis (n. 9) 112–13, Gjerstad, *SCE* iv.2 476–7, 485–9. The hypothesis is disproved by the contents of *SCE* iv.2 itself.

³⁰ See e.g. for Kition M. Robertson, *Kition* iv (Nicosia 1981) 71 (‘some decline’ in the early fifth century); L. Jehasse, *ibid.* 77 (only 3.5% of the black glaze pottery found at Kition dated 500–450 BC).

³¹ Marion: *SCE* iv.2 279–81. Amathous: *BCH* lxxxv (1961) 312–14; lxxxviii (1964) 329–30; see generally N. Weill, *Salamine de Chypre* iv (Paris 1973) 78.

470–60), or the marble head of a youth from the Paphian sanctuary of Aphrodite (c. 480–70).³² Conversely, local Cypriot sculpture of the second quarter of the fifth century is seemingly inspired by the contemporary ‘severe style’ of Greek art.³³

In the second half of the fifth century Greek imports to Cyprus increase perceptibly. At Kition nearly 50% of the imported Attic fifth- and fourth-century pottery found so far is dated to c. 450–400 BC; at Salamis the numerically largest group of imported Red Figure vessels is ascribed to the years c. 420–370; at Marion the highest proportion of Attic imports (‘39.1% of the total sum of pottery’) was found in tombs of the Cypro-Classical I B period (c. 440–400).³⁴ Archaeologically a continuous, if increasing, impact of Greek art characterizes the civilization of Cyprus during the fifth and fourth centuries—not an isolation from Greece or an anti-Greek movement.³⁵

Seen in a more general context, the basic concept of sharp division and racial enmity between the two ethnic groups in the population of Cyprus can hardly be proved by the evidence available. A number of other testimonies point to a considerable degree of peaceful co-existence, mutual cultural exchange and even intermarriage.³⁶ It seems significant for the political climate of the island (and not at all indicative of ethnic antagonism) that a Phoenician could attain a position of high trust with a Greek king of Salamis, and that *vice versa* Euagoras, a scion of the Greek royal house of Salamis, could live unmolested under the rule of this Phoenician usurper. An alternative hypothesis about the symbiosis of the two ethnic groups in Cyprus seems at least as plausible: the divisions may have been not so much vertical, between Greeks and Phoenicians, but horizontal, between ruling groups and subjects. Interests of rulers and ruled may have been divided in a way comparable to conditions in Cyprus under Turkish rule.³⁷

To sum up: we will have to discard a number of ‘facts’ which on closer inspection turn out to be mere speculations which only seem to support each other—factoids on which no reconstruction of the history of Cyprus in this period can be based. An unbiased interpretation of the remaining body of tolerably reliable evidence does not warrant the assumption of a Perso-Phoenician alliance which ‘had wished to make Cyprus a cultural bastion of Asia against Greece’, nor of Euagoras aspiring ‘to make the island a united state, a Greek state, a cultural bulwark against Asia’.³⁸ What can reasonably be inferred from a fairly small number of isolated facts is the existence of conflicting aims and divided interests amongst the Cypriot kingdoms, apparent already during the Ionian Revolt. The building and repair of fortifications during this period³⁹ may be considered as an indication of such a state of affairs. Political disunity certainly facilitated Persian rule. Phoenician kings may indeed have been more amenable at times. They could hardly count on outside backing, as Greek dynasties could do at certain periods—although Greek Cypriot kings may have had no particular leanings toward democracy as propagated by their would-be Athenian allies. But one single instance of military co-operation of Persians and Phoenicians against a Greek city proves neither an exclusive support of the Phoenicians nor a systematic anti-Greek policy based on ‘national’ motives or cultural prejudices. Given the peculiar situation of Cyprus, the differences between Greek and Phoenician dynasties seem to

³² C. C. Vermeule, *Greek and Roman Cyprus* (Boston 1976) 15–17; Tatton-Brown (n. 4) 100. The head from Paphos is now in the Ashmolean Museum (G 1142); see F. G. Maier–V. Karageorghis, *Paphos* (Nicosia 1984) 181 fig. 170.

³³ Weill (n. 31) 78; Pouilloux (n. 5) 116; M. Yon, *Salamine de Chypre* v (Paris 1974).

³⁴ Kition: Robertson (n. 30) 71–3; Jehasse (n. 30) 77–8. At Kition–Bamboula the situation is somewhat different: 20.8% of the Attic finds date from c. 425–375; the peak is reached here c. 350–325 with 43.3% (J. F. Salles, in *Kition–Bamboula* ii [Paris 1983] 54–5). Salamis: L. Jehasse, in *Salamine de Chypre. Histoire et archéologie*

(Paris 1980) 215–17; *id.*, *Salamine de Chypre* viii (Paris 1978) 4–8, 17. Marion: *SCE* iv.2 280.

³⁵ The *ad hoc* distinction between ‘commercial relations’ and ‘cultural impact’ (Gjerstad, *SCE* iv.2 364) seems hardly tenable if only applied to this period.

³⁶ Collected by Seibert (n. 6) 1–27. His arguments, as those of Costa (below n. 41), have hardly been taken notice of so far.

³⁷ Maier (n. 4) 121–2.

³⁸ *SCE* iv.2 502.

³⁹ Idalion: see above no. 10. Golgoi: *BCH* xcv (1971) 404–6; xcvi (1972) 1073; xcvi (1973) 673. Palaipaphos: Maier, *RDAC* 1967, 43–4; 1973, 190–2.

have been of secondary importance to the Achaemenid state. Persian policy was not anti-Greek on principle: no measures were taken, as mentioned above, when the Greek Euagoras deposed the Phoenician Abdemon at Salamis in 411 BC; nor is there any proof that changes from Greek to Phoenician rulers at Marion or Lapethos were engineered by Persia. Achaemenid rule pragmatically resorted to a well-tried instrument of politics when it exploited the divided interests of the kingdoms in the island.

A fundamental conflict between Greeks and Phoenicians resulting from racial or cultural motives can, on the other hand, hardly be inferred from one single instance of a Phoenician dynasty annexing a Greek kingdom (Kition would meet Greeks wherever it tried to extend its territory), and one single instance of a Phoenician pretender forcibly ousting a Greek king. Differences between Greeks and Phoenicians, still manifest in language, art and religion, may have influenced politics to some degree. But the Greeks themselves seem rarely to have been united by national aims and feelings. Thus in 499 BC Phoenician Kition obviously joined the Revolt, while the Greek kings of Salamis and Amathous refused to do so and Stasanor of Kourion deserted the Greek cause in battle. Divided loyalties must have been even more marked in the Greek Cypriot kingdoms than in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor.⁴⁰

What we can reconstruct with a reasonable degree of certainty of the history of the Cypriot kingdoms in the Classical period principally reveals elements of traditional dynastic conflicts. The policies of the individual kingdoms primarily aim at the expansion of their own political or economic power irrespective of the ethnic group. The career of Euagoras—strange as it may sound at first hearing—demonstrates this in a remarkable way. His foreign policy was, first and foremost, Salaminian power politics. During the first two decades of his reign, from 411 to c. 391 BC, there is no evidence for anti-Persian schemes or for plans to liberate Cyprus as a Greek island.⁴¹ Euagoras' political actions, clearly directed towards a Salaminian hegemony over Cyprus, furthered for a long time the interests of Achaemenid Persia by assisting her to eliminate Spartan naval power. Until 391 he remained in principle loyal to his overlord, the Great King, and his 'revolt' in that year was hardly a well-planned act of defiance forming part of an anti-Persian grand design. His rupture with the Great King seems in the last resort to have sprung from a wrong assessment of Persian policy: Artaxerxes' decision to support the Cypriot cities attacked by Euagoras (Diod. xiv 98.4–6) drove the Salaminian king to revolt.

Euagoras' rule thus indicates how policies in Cyprus were dictated by the material interests of the kingdoms rather than by ideological motives. He himself impartially attacked and annexed Greek and Phoenician dynasties; adapting himself to changing political situations, he fought with his Persian overlord or against him. Independence may have been his final aim, but hardly union with Greece, to whose political system his monarchy would never have conformed. His philhellenic leanings, which attracted Greek artists and writers to Salamis, had without doubt a lasting impact on the process of Hellenization in Cyprus. But even here it is open to discussion whether his attitude really represents a 'Greek national consciousness', or whether he was only motivated by pretensions similar to those of the Great King and many of his vassal rulers.

Seen in this way, the history of Cyprus in the Classical period may appear less exciting and less accentuated by clear-cut issues. But critical examination has to admit that there are—here as in other periods of ancient history—many lacunae which cannot be filled but by sheer imagination. A. L. Rowse once observed that 'history is a good deal closer to poetry than is generally realized; in truth, I think, it is in essence the same'.⁴² Yet if imagination is the common gift of poets and historians, one difference remains: the historian has to control his imagination.

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⁴⁰ S. T. Parker, *AJP* xcvi (1976) 37 even suspects that 'Cimon's failure to gain the support of the Cypriote Greek cities' was a reason for the failure of the expedition.

⁴¹ This has been shown by E. A. Costa, 'Euagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 B.C.', *Historia* xxiii (1974) 40–56.

⁴² *The Uses of History* (London 1946) 55.